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PRAGMATIC IMPLICATION AND CONDITIONALS 
WITH THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE IN LATE EGYPTIAN 
Mark COLLIER 
(University of Liverpool) 
Résumé. Analyse du rôle de l’obversion (complète ou partielle), un 
type d’inférence pragmatique affectant la signification des condi-
tionnelles en néo-égyptien. Cette étude se concentre sur les 
constructions recourant au futur III négatif. 
Abstract. A discussion of the role of implicated full and partial 
obversion in reading Late Egyptian conditionals. The paper centres 
on conditionals displaying the negative third future. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Part of what has been most distinctive and significant about the work of 
Pascal Vernus has been the close regard he has had for meaning in 
Ancient Egyptian, as well as form. It is a considerable pleasure to be 
able to offer a paper to celebrate him and his work, and I hope that the 
following paper, with its investigation of meaning in conditionals in 
Late Egyptian, will be of interest to him. 
In order to take an article-sized slice through conditional expression 
and usage in Late Egyptian, I limit the range of this paper primarily to 
conditionals containing explicit examples of the negative third future 
tense (bn iw.f r sDm), a form which is uncontentious in its identification, 
along with certain other relevant examples with the affirmative third 
future to clarify points raised. I will also restrict myself primarily 
(though again not exclusively) to late Twentieth Dynasty texts (princi-
pally the tomb robbery papyri and other late Ramesside documents). I 
should stress from the outset that I am using examples with the negative 
third future simply as a means to discuss certain aspects of the meaning 
(particularly pragmatic implications) of Late Egyptian conditionals and 
not as an opportunity to discuss the occurrence or meaning of the 
negative third future itself. 
2. THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE  
IN THE ANTECEDENT CLAUSE OF THE inn CONDITIONAL 
The key example for the appearance of the negative third future in the 
antecedent clause of inn conditionals comes from pMayer B: 
Ex. 1 pMayer B, ll. 4–5 (= KRI VI, 515,10-12) 
Pais attempts to coerce his way into a share of the proceeds of a 
robbery: 
ir nA HD i-gm.k inn bn iw.k dit n.i im.w iw.i Sm r Dd.f nA pA HAty-a n 
imnt nA Atw 
“as for the monies which you have found, if you are not going to 
give me (anything) from them, I am going to go to tell of it (to) the 
people of the governor of the west and the inspectors”1 
This is a conditional threat. The threat is presented in the consequent 
(the threat to report the thefts to the authorities), but the activation or 
cancellation of the threat is treated as being reliant on the trigger, or 
enabling factor, of whether or not the antecedent condition reflects the 
intentions of the hearer. Conditional threats have the following attri-
butes:2 
1) The antecedent is undesirable for the speaker3 
2) The hearer has control over whether the antecedent is realised or 
not 
3) The speaker wants the hearer not to realise the antecedent 
4) The speaker considers the consequent undesirable for the hearer 
5) The speaker has control over the realisation of the consequent 
This meets the properties of the Late Egyptian conditional in ex. 1 
nicely: 
1) The antecedent-condition of not being given a share from the 
thefts is clearly undesirable to the speaker (he wants to be given 
the money) 
                                                
1 For the intentional or volitional sense of the negative third future here, see 
St. Polis, “Les relations entre futur et modalité déontique. À propos des sens du futur III 
en néo-égyptien”, LingAeg 14 (2006), p. 240-244, with pMayer B, ll. 4-5 as ex. 27 
(p. 242). For the marking of the condition with inn, see M. Collier, “The Lure of Alterity: 
inn Conditionals in Late Egyptian”, LingAeg 14 (2006), p. 181-198 with pMayer B, ll. 4-
5 as ex. 20 (p. 193) and M. Collier, “Conditionals in Late Egyptian”, in E. Grossman, 
M. Haspelmath & T.S. Richter (eds.), Egyptian-Coptic Linguistics in Typological 
Perspective (forthcoming), section 2. 
2 Ing. Van Canegem-Ardijns & W. Van Belle, “Conditionals and Types of Condi-
tional Perfection”, Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008), p. 357-358. 
3 Simply for terminological consistency, I will use the terms “speaker” and “hearer” 
(in the singular) throughout to represent the main parties in the conditional exchange. 
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 2) The hearer has control currently over whether the speaker is given 
a share or not (though is being coerced here into considering 
giving Pais a share) 
3) The speaker wants the hearer to give him a share in the money 
(negation cancellation of [if you not-not give me a share]) 
4) The speaker considers his going to report the matter to higher 
authorities to be undesirable for the hearer  
5) The speaker has control over the consequent action of going to 
report the matter to higher authorities. 
The conditional presents two alternatives, one explicitly stated and the 
other, its obverse, pragmatically implicated (an invited inference).4 The 
conditional as actually expressed conveys an undesirable state of affairs 
for both the speaker (antecedent) and hearer (consequent) and links the 
two together conditionally:5 
A: [you not give me a share] → [I report thefts to higher authorities] 
The implicated obverse of this presents the alternate in which the 
realisation of the desirable state of affairs for the speaker leads to the 
realisation of the desirable state of affairs for the hearer, an obverse 
relationship which is consistent with the explicit conditional in context: 
If you are going to give me something from them, I will not go to 
tell of it to the people of the governor of the west and the inspectors. 
B: [you give me a share] → [I not report thefts to higher authorities] 
This implicated obverse offers the hearer the opportunity to head off the 
threat by giving Pais access to a share (whether this had been intended 
all along or is a response to Pais’s threat). And, indeed, this is what 
happens: the unnamed speaker goes on to state that the thieves coaxed 
Pais round from his threat by promising to take him to the tomb (of 
Ramesses VI) so that he could get a share for himself (pMayer B, ll. 5-
6). A few days later they do indeed take Pais to the tomb (pMayer B, 
ll. 6ff.). So it is this implied obverse-alternate which actually guides 
events, since the hearers act on this alternate and give Pais access to a 
share (and clearly expect, in return, that he will not report the thefts). 
Notice, however, that this action is not directly taken in relation to the 
conditional as actually stated but is directly taken in relation to the 
                                                
4 For the practical/pragmatic reasoning in such conditional perfection readings (as 
opposed to logically valid deduction), see L.R. Horn, “From If to Iff: Conditional 
Perfection as Pragmatic Strengthening”, Journal of Pragmatics 32 (2000), p. 289-326. 
5 For a discussion of desirability/undesirability in conditionals see, for example, 
N. Akatsuka, “Negative Conditionality, Subjectification and Conditional Reasoning”, in 
A. Athanasiadou & R. Dirven (eds.), On Conditionals Again (Current Issues in Linguistic 
Theory 143), 1997, p. 323-354. 
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unstated but implicated obverse relationship retrieved by the hearers 
through pragmatic interpretation (seemingly the same to both ancient 
hearers and modern readers).6 
The implicated obversion in ex. 1 affects both the antecedent and 
consequent clauses in the conditional: [-antecedent] → [-consequent]. I 
shall refer to this as the implicated full obverse (IFO).7 
In the specific context of the interaction between the two parties, the 
following two implications do not seem to be appropriate and seem to be 
inconsistent in practice with the conditional as stated (A). The first is: 
C:  *[you give me a share] → [I report thefts to higher authorities] 
with the antecedent obversed [-antecedent] but the consequent as stated 
[+consequent], a relationship which would scarcely appeal to the hearer 
in this case.8 If this implication were as readily entertained here as B, 
then the hearer would scarcely be readily coerced into giving Pais a 
share without significant additional discussion as to Pais’s intended 
actions. As will be discussed below, whether implication B or C is 
treated as being consistent in context with the conditional as stated (A) 
is often a key element in reading a conditional in context. The second is: 
D: *[you not give me a share] → [I not report thefts to higher 
authorities] 
with the antecedent as in the stated conditional [+antecedent] but the 
consequent obversed [-consequent]. Clearly if the antecedent is (taken to 
be) true ([you are not going to give me a share]), then the obversed 
consequent in D is contradictory to the stated consequent in the 
                                                
6 In addition there is a biconditional exclusivising strengthening (‘only’), resulting 
from taking A and B together. Ing. Van Canegem-Ardijns & W. Van Belle, Journal of 
Pragmatics 40 (2008), p. 357-358 argue for an “only if not-p, not-q” biconditional 
reading for conditional threats: “only if you are going to give me a share will I not report 
the thefts to higher authorities”, equivalent to “I will report it to higher authorities unless 
you give me a share”, or perhaps to paraphrase: “I’m prepared to report it to higher 
authorities unless you give me a share”. In contrast, the strengthening is usually taken to 
be of the “only if p, q” type: “only if you do not give me a share will I report you”. 
7 For further discussion of obversion in Late Egyptian conditionals, specifically 
counterfactual conditionals, see M. Collier, “Late Egyptian Counterfactual Conditionals 
and Counterfactual Reasoning”, to appear in a forthcoming Festschrift. 
8 Indicating that the conditional in ex. 1 is not to be interpreted (nor is taken by the 
ancient participants) as strictly equivalent to the material conditional of logic, for, in that 
case, interpretation C too should be taken as being consistent with the stated conditional 
in ex. 1. However, in terms of human interaction as displayed in the co(n)text, 
interpretation C is not one which either party seems to entertain seriously in practice 
(rather the conditional is given the biconditional interpretation discussed here).  
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 conditional as expressed (A): [I will not report the thefts] is plainly in 
contradiction to [I will report the thefts] and there is no threat.9 
I shall utilise the labels assigned above (A-D) in order to discuss 
antecedent-consequent implications, here given schematically:10 
 Antecedent Consequent 
A [+antecedent] [+consequent] 
B [–antecedent] [–consequent] 
C [–antecedent] [+consequent] 
D [+antecedent] [–consequent] 
Tab. 1. Table of antecedent-consequent relations A-D 
On this basis, a table of appropriate and inappropriate pragmatic impli-
cations can be drawn up for ex. 1 (grey background indicates inappro-
priate pragmatic implications, leaving the appropriate pragmatic impli-
cations without background): 
 Antecedent Consequent  
A [you not give  me a share] 
[I report thefts  
to authorities] undesirable 
B [you give  me a share] 
[I not report thefts 
to authorities] desirable 
C [you give me a share] 
[I report thefts to 
authorities]  
D [you not give me a share] 
[I not report thefts 
to authorities]  
Tab. 2. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pMayer B, ll. 4-5 
The pragmatic effect is a quite general one and not restricted to exam-
ples with an explicit negation in the antecedent; indeed implicated full 
obversion (B) is the more commonly attested pattern for implicated 
obversion with conditionals (whether marked with ir iw, inn or h-n). The 
following provides an example of a conditional with inn + affirmative 
third future antecedent with implicated full obverse interpretation: 
Ex. 2 pBM EA 10052, vs. 12, l. 18 (= KRI VI, 794,8-9) 
Dutemheb is being interrogated. He claims not to have seen any-
thing. After being beaten again, he says, “I didn’t see anything”: 
inn iw.k Dd i-gA gAy.i 
“if you will (just) say ‘lie’, then I will lie”11 
                                                
9 In truth-conditional terms, this is the combination of true antecedent and false 
consequent which produces a false conditional and thus one inconsistent with A. 
10 This mimics, of course, the standard truth table in logic for the conditional 
operator. 
11 For the volitional sense, again see St. Polis, LingAeg 14 (2006), p. 240-244. 
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This example reflects nicely both the full implicated obverse and the 
combination of the explicit conditional and the full implicated obverse 
to produce a biconditional reading (“conditional perfection”) strengthen-
ing the exclusivity of the antecedent for the consequent (with the sense 
of “I won’t lie unless you tell me to”): 
IFO: if you will not say “lie” [= say “Don’t lie”], then I won’t lie 
Bic: only if you will say “lie” will I lie 
The antecedent seems to be treated by the speaker as undesirable to the 
hearer (and indeed the speaker) and is under the control of the hearer; 
the consequent is presented as also undesirable to the hearer and the 
speaker and is under the direct control of the speaker. As such, the 
speaker is indicating how the hearer might guide the speaker’s actions, 
presumably on the basis that the hearer should not want the speaker to 
behave in this way. Notice that, as with ex. 1, the alternate desirable 
state of affairs [you not tell me to lie] → [I not lie] is again merely 
implicated. As with ex. 1, this can be presented in a table along with the 
inappropriate C and D interpretations: 
 Antecedent Consequent  
A [you tell  me to lie] [I lie] undesirable 
B [you not tell  me to lie] [I not lie] desirable 
C [you not tell me to lie] [I lie]  
D [you tell me to lie] [I not lie]  
Tab. 3. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pBM EA10052, 12, l. 18 
It is noticeable that this example provides another instance of the “[you 
do something] leads-to [me doing something]” type of conditional (an 
interactional conditional) in which actions of the interlocutor are 
presented as providing (enabling or trigger) conditions for actions of the 
speaker, a regular part of human interaction and negotiation. 
The tomb robbery papyri also provide two nice examples of condi-
tionals with inn + affirmative third future antecedents which allow only 
for an implicated partial obverse (IPO) reading: 
Ex. 3 pBM EA 10052, vs. 8, l. 5 (= KRI VI, 785,15-16) 
Sekhahatyamun is being interrogated. His initial response is to 
claim that he had nothing to do with the thefts from tombs at 
Thebes. He does, however, confess to involvement in other 
robberies: 
MARK COLLIER48
 inn iw.tw Xdb.i Hr nA (m)aHa n iw-(m)-itrw ntw nA wn.i im 
“if I am going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs, then (at 
least) they are the ones I’ve been in” 
Ex. 4 pBM EA 10052, vs. 11, l. 12 (= KRI VI, 791,14) 
Ankhefenamun is being interrogated. He claims to have had 
nothing to do with the theft and to know nothing of any tombs 
which the men in his charge may have been in: 
inn iw.tw Xdb(.i) Hr rmT ntf tAy.i TAw 
“if I am going to be killed because of someone (else), then my 
theft/crime is (really) his” 
In both of these examples the consequent holds (or not) regardless of 
whether or not the situation in the antecedent comes to pass12 — the 
consequent is entailed by the conditional and is not dependent for its 
truth (or falsity) on the antecedent. The implications are: 
IFO: *If I am not going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs, then 
these are not the ones I have been in. 
IPO: If I am not going to be killed because of the Iumitru tombs, then 
these are (still) the ones I have been in. 
IFO: *If I am not going to be killed because of someone (else), then my 
crime is not his 
IPO: If I am not going to be killed because of someone (else), then my 
crime is (still) his. 
It is noticeable that both examples have nominal sentence consequents 
(and so do not refer to dynamic actions) and the consequents have their 
immediate realisation or force in the utterance of the conditional. As 
such the consequent does not provide a consequential outcome awaiting 
the realisation or non-realisation of the event in the antecedent but rather 
provides a comment on the situation the speaker finds himself in and, in 
particular, the attributed cause for his being killed (acceptance in ex. 3, 
denial in ex. 4). Insofar as there is an enabling chain here, the condi-
tionals in exx. 3 and 4 do not refer to a sequence of real-world content: 
the two men actually being killed for the reasons stated does not, of 
course, lead to one of them having been in those tombs or the other to 
being mistakenly accused. Rather, knowledge/awareness of the situa-
tions depicted in the explicit antecedent motivates (triggers) them to 
                                                
12 This can be reflected in an extended paraphrase: “If I am going to be killed 
because of the Iumitru tombs, and even if I am not going to be killed because of the 
Iumitru tombs, these are the ones I have been in” and “If I am going to be killed because 
of someone else, and even if I am not going to be killed because of someone else, my 
crime is his”. 
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deliver their comments on that antecedent situation.13 The pragmatic 
implication relationships can be tabulated in terms of antecedent-
consequent relations as follows: 
 Antecedent Consequent 
A [I to be killed because of Iumitru tombs] 
[these are the ones  
I was in] 
B [I not to be killed because of Iumitru tombs] 
[these are not the 
ones I was in] 
C [I not to be killed because of Iumitru tombs] 
[these are the ones  
I was in] 
D [I to be killed because of Iumitru tombs] 
[these are not the 
ones I was in] 
Tab. 4. Table of antecedent/consequent relations for pBM EA10052, 8, l. 5 
 Antecedent Consequent 
A [I to be killed because of someone else] [my crime is his] 
B [I not to be killed because of someone else] [my crime is not his] 
C [I not to be killed because of someone else] [my crime is his] 
D [I to be killed because of someone else] [my crime is not his] 
Tab. 5. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pBM EA10052, 11, l. 12 
3. THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE  
IN THE CONSEQUENT CLAUSE OF THE ir iw CONDITIONAL 
And so on to three examples of the negative third future in the conse-
quent clause of ir iw conditionals:14 
Ex. 5 pBM EA 10416 vs., ll. 11-12 (= J. Janssen, Late Ramesside Letters 
and Communications [HPBM 6], 1991, pl. 17, ll. 11-12) 
A woman who has been sleeping with a man who is not her hus-
band is under threat of violence. A steward has restrained those 
threatening violence once, but writes to the woman, pointing out 
the following: 
                                                
13 On conditionals of this type not licensing conditional perfection inferences, 
cf. L.R. Horn, Journal of Pragmatics 32 (2000), p. 317-318 and Ing. Van Canegem-
Ardijns & W. Van Belle, Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008), p. 365-366. 
14 There is an example of the negative third future in the antecedent clause of an ir iw 
conditional from pBM EA 10418+10287 rt., ll. 3-5 (= J. Janssen, LRLC, pl. 19): ir iw bn 
iw.n gmt.s r qnqn.s iw.n gm rtA tAy.s snt Sri. However, this short communiqué lacks suffi-
cient context to feel confident about the nuance conveyed by the tense selection. 
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 yA ir iw i[n]ty(.i) sn m pAy sp bn iw.i inty.w m ky 
“actually, (even) if I have restrained them this time, I won’t (be 
able to) restrain them another (time)” 
Ex. 6 pBiblNat 198II (LRL no. 46) vs., ll. 6-7 (= J. Černý, Late 
Ramesside Letters [BiAeg 9], 1939, p. 68, 9-10 [= LRL]) 
The letter writer shows, as he has done regularly through his letter, 
his disgruntlement with the intended recipient: 
ir iw.k m TAty bn iw.i hAy r nAy.k skty 
“(even) if you were the vizier, I wouldn’t get into your boats” 
Ex. 7 pBM EA 10052, rt. 1, ll. 19-21 (= KRI VI, 769,2-5) 
The scribe of the necropolis Nesamenope challenges Bukhaaf’s 
account of the robberies: 
ir iw.i Sm mtw.i TAw wa Xn n anx m wa ih(y) mtw ky Sm (m-)sA.i bn 
iw.i smtr.f r dit dmi n.f sbA[yt] i-r-m.i 
“if I were to go and take a goatskin from a stall and another went 
in following me, I would not denounce him (just) to make the 
punishment fall on him along with me” 
The first two examples (exx. 5 and 6) can readily be read as (scalar) 
concessive conditionals. I have already discussed the properties of 
concessive conditionals in building an implicated scalar set of condi-
tions in which the stated antecedent is a limiting condition.15 As such, 
and as is well known,16 these conditionals are not subject to implicated 
full obversion. Rather the obverse to the antecedent takes its place 
among the inclusive set of conditions (explicit and implicated), along 
with other pragmatically relevant conditions (which are to be accessed 
for specific meaning in context). The stated consequent then applies to 
the set of conditions, and thus such conditionals display implicated 
partial obversion (here contrasted with the inappropriateness of impli-
cated full obversion): 
IFO: *If I had not restrained them this time, I would be able to restrain 
them another (time)  
IPO: If I had not restrained them this time, I (still/certainly) wouldn’t be 
able to restrain them another (time).17  
                                                
15 See M. Collier, “Pragmatics and Meaning Construction in Late Egyptian: Of 
Implicatures, Pragmatic Scales, and Scope”, LingAeg 17 (2009), p. 15-17 and “Late 
Egyptian Counterfactual Conditionals” (forthcoming Festschrift).  
16 See, for example, E. König, “Conditionals, Concessive Conditionals and Conces-
sives: Areas of Contrast, Overlap and Neutralization”, in E.C. Traugott, A. ter Meuelen, 
J. Snitzer Reilly & Ch.A. Ferguson (eds.), On Conditionals, 1986, p. 236; L.R. Horn, 
Journal of Pragmatics 32 (2000), p. 318; Ing. Van Canegem-Ardijns & W. Van Belle, 
Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008), p. 367. 
17 Inference C would be counterfactual, but this still bolsters the point that the 
speaker is making that in any event, including the stated circumstance of being able to 
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IFO: *If you were not the Vizier, I would get into your boats 
IPO: If you were not the Vizier, I would (still/certainly) not get into 
your boats 
In ex. 5 the antecedent was presumably desirable to the hearer, the 
speaker had control over it and the hearer presumably wanted the speak-
er to do it (the speaker restrained the mob). The conditional, however, 
points out that the speaker will not be able to repeat this. As such the 
speaker is heading off what may be (being modelled as) an expectation/ 
assumption in the context (she can’t rely on this again): 
[I restrain them this time] → [I restrain them another] 
This, of course, is the D inference inconsistent with the conditional as 
stated (through contradictory consequents in the context of a true 
antecedent) and so the conditional is used to exclude this inference 
pragmatically (him restraining them this time will not lead to him being 
able to restrain them next time): 
 Antecedent Consequent 
A [I restrain them  this time] 
[I not restrain them 
another time] 
B [I not restrain them this time] 
[I restrain them 
another time] 
C [I not restrain them this time] 
[I not restrain them 
another time] 
D [I restrain them  this time] 
[I restrain them 
another time] 
Tab. 6. Table of antecedent-consequent relations  
for pBM EA10416 vs., ll. 11-12 
Ex. 6 can be read in a similar manner. The speaker presents the hypo-
thetical limiting condition of the hearer holding the position of Vizier 
and states that he would not go along with him even in such a 
circumstance, and so, by implication, not in any circumstance lower in 
the scale (including one in which the hearer has the status he actually 
has). Through deploying the concessive conditional, the speaker thus 
heads off the modelled possibility that he might be taken to follow along 
with the hearer: the D interpretation inconsistent with the conditional as 
stated (A): 
[you as Vizier] → [I get into your boats] 
                                                
restrain them this time or the counterfactual situation of him not having been able to do 
so, he will not be able to do so again. The implicated counterfactual provides a less 
extreme case and so strengthens the sense of the stated antecedent as a limiting condition. 
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 By scalar ranking and counterpart matching this also excludes the B 
interpretation (the hearer in his actual status is, of course, a more 
pragmatically salient condition within the included set than just the 
general obverse situation of him not being the Vizier): 
[you as not Vizier (incl. you as you)] → [I get into your boats] 
Again this can be tabulated as follows: 
 Antecedent Consequent 
A [you as Vizier] [I not get  into your boats] 
B [you not as Vizier  (incl. you as you)] 
[I get  
into your boats] 
C [you not as Vizier  (incl. you as you)] 
[I not get 
into your boats] 
D [you as Vizier] [I get  into your boats] 
Tab. 7. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for pBiblNat 198II vs., ll. 6-7 
Ex. 7 is not as clear in its full nuance.18 It seems to present an imaginary 
analogy in the antecedent (rather like ex. 6, but this time reflecting 
perhaps an imaginary case as a distillation of properties akin to the real 
context rather than a scale ranging over the imaginary context and the 
real context) and then a comment by the speaker on how the speaker 
would act in this situation (presumably to be compared to the actions of 
the hearer). Taking this reading, then the implicated obversions are (I 
assign negation minimally to the antecedent for sense): 
IFO: *if I were to go and didn’t take a goatskin from a stall and another 
went in following me, I would denounce him (just) to make the 
punishment fall on him along with me 
IPO: if I were to go and didn’t take a goatskin from a stall and another 
went in following me, I would not denounce him (just) to make the 
punishment fall on him along with me 
Of course, the relevance of the IPO reading is rather low:19 once the 
antecedent condition is negated (and effectively cancelled) there is little 
relevance in context in invoking the consequent at all (though the 
invoked consequent would still be that of the explicit conditional). The 
more pragmatically salient comparison is the assumed similarity 
                                                
18 For example, the consequent is taken as a flexion question by D. Sweeney, 
Correspondence and Dialogue: Pragmatic Factors in Late Ramesside Letter-Writing 
(ÄAT 49), 2001, p. 111, ex. 13, and thus read with a rather different nuance in detail. 
19 Cf. Ing. Van Canegem-Ardijns & W. Van Belle, Journal of Pragmatics 40 (2008), 
p. 362-365. 
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between the stated antecedent situation and Bukhaaf’s situation (which 
is, technically, not an act of taking a goatskin), and the speaker’s appli-
cation of the consequent across both situations, imaginary and real. If 
this reading is the intended reading (I note again the possibility of a 
flexion question reading of the consequent), then the conditional would 
seem to be excluding an antecedent-consequent relationship which 
would be intended to be analogous to Bukhaaf’s account: 
[I take goatskin and another follows]  
 → [I denounce him for punishment] 
Once again, this would be the D implication: 
 Antecedent Consequent 
A [I take goatskin and another follows] 
[I not denounce him 
for punishment] 
B [I not take goatskin and another follows] 
[I denounce him  
for punishment] 
C [I not take goatskin and another follows] 
[I not denounce him 
for punishment] 
D [I take goatskin and another follows] 
[I denounce him  
for punishment] 
Tab. 8. Table of antecedent-consequent relations 
for pBM EA 10052, rt. 1, ll. 19-21 
Of course, ir iw conditionals also occur displaying implicated full 
obversion. For example, the Late Ramesside Letters provide a clear late 
Twentieth Dynasty writing of the affirmative third future, with written r, 
in the consequent clause of an ir iw conditional: 
Ex. 8 pBM EA 75019+10302 vs., l. 4 (= R.J. Demarée, The Bankes Late 
Ramesside Papyri [BMRP 155], 2006, pl. 16, l. 4) 
The sender of the letter is discussing certain items which the 
addressee has not had delivered. The sender refers to an earlier 
letter in which the addressee had said: 
ir iw.k hAb an iw.i r dit in.tw n.k 
“If you write again, I will have them sent to you” 
This example displays implicated full obversion, as well as a 
biconditional reading (resulting from the combination of explicit and 
implicated alternates) indicating that having the items sent requires the 
original addressee specifically to write back to request them (which he is 
now doing): 
IFO: If you don’t write again, I will not have them sent to you 
Bic: Only if you write again will I have them sent to you 
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 This is another example of an interactional conditional of the “[you do 
something] leads-to [me doing something]” type. In this example, the 
antecedent of the stated conditional is desired by the speaker, but the 
hearer has control over it, whereas the consequent is desired by the 
hearer but under the control of the speaker. Unlike ex. 1, it is the more 
desirable relationship which is presented as the explicitly stated 
conditional and provides the relationship which is acted upon: 
 Antecedent Consequent 
A [You write  to me again] 
[I have goods  
sent to you] 
B [You not write  to me again] 
[I not have goods 
sent to you] 
C [You not write  to me again] 
[I have goods  
sent to you] 
D [You write  to me again] 
[I not have goods 
sent to you] 
Tab. 9. Table of antecedent-consequent relations 
for pBM EA 75019+10302 vs., l. 4 
4. THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE AFTER wn  
IN THE CONSEQUENT CLAUSE OF THE h-n CONDITIONAL 
The late Twentieth Dynasty material does not supply us with an exam-
ple of the negative third future in a h-n conditional. However, a good 
example occurs in Wenamun: 
Ex. 9 Wenamun, 2, ll. 28-30 (= A.H. Gardiner, Late Egyptian Stories 
[BiAeg 1], 1932, p. 69, l. 14-16) 
Wenamun directly exploits Tjekerbaal’s argument to reconfigure 
his own: 
ir pAy.k Dd wn nA nsy HAwty dit in.tw HD nbw h-n wn (m)-di.w anx 
snb wn bn iw.w dit in.tw nA (A)xt 
“as for your saying that previous kings used to have silver and 
gold sent, if they had had life and health, they would not have had 
these things sent” 
The counterfactual licenses implicated full obversion (IFO = B): 
IFO: if they had not had life and health, they would have had these 
things sent 
and, as is clear from the context, this is treated by Wenamun as 
reflecting the actual state of affairs, as picked up in the following 
sentence in the text: Wen. 2, l. 30: i-ir.w dit in.tw nA Axt (r)-DbA anx snb 
nAy.f ity “they did send these things, but instead of life and health, to 
your ancestors”. In contrast, implications C and D are not appropriate: 
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C: if they had not had life and health, they would not have had 
these things sent 
D: if they had had life and health, they would have had these 
things sent 
In table form: 
 Antecedent Consequent 
A [they have life and health] 
[they not send 
silver and gold] 
B [they not have life and health] 
[they send 
silver and gold] 
C [they not have life and health] 
[they not send  
silver and gold] 
D [they have  life and health] 
[they send 
silver and gold] 
Tab. 10. Table of antecedent-consequent relations for Wenamun, 2, ll. 20-30 
Note that the presence of the negative third future in the consequent of 
this example showing implicated full obversion indicates that, whilst 
negation plays a significant role in the implicated partial obverse 
inferences discussed for the negative third future consequents in exx. 5-
7 above, this inference is not produced simply as a consequence of the 
presence of explicit negation in the consequent.20 
5.  THE NEGATIVE THIRD FUTURE  
IN THE CONSEQUENT CLAUSE OF THE inn CONDITIONAL 
Finally, and to turn nearly full circle, an example with a negative third 
future in the consequent of an inn conditional: 
Ex. 10 pBiblNat 198III (LRL no. 47) vs., ll. 3-4 (= LRL 69,15-16) 
The sender (possibly Dhutmose) complains about the apparent 
failure of the recipient to carry out a particular task assigned to 
him, including failure to heed the instruction (previously given by 
the sender) to dispatch staff to get grain to supply men he has 
working for him. Having reiterated his complaint that the recipient 
just doesn’t seem to listen, he goes on to comment with the 
following conditional and then reiterates the key element of his 
instruction to send staff to get grain: 
inn nAy.k sHnw aSA r.k bn iw.k rx Sm m pAy sHn n pr-aA a.w.s. 
“if your assignments are too much for you, then you will not be 
able to carry out this (particular) assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h.” 
                                                
20 For fuller discussion of this example, with focus on its counterfactual status and 
the reasoning patterns it invokes, see M. Collier, “Late Egyptian Counterfactual Condi-
tionals and Counterfactual Reasoning” (forthcoming Festschrift), ex. 1 with discussion. 
MARK COLLIER56
 As so often, the particular sense of this conditional turns on the exact 
sense of a key phrase, in this case the sense of Sm m, which has been 
usually taken to mean “carry out, proceed with”,21 but also to “get out 
of”.22 The “carrying out” sense seems more appropriate and so is taken 
here.  
The conditional taken in this sense23 has a straightforward IFO infer-
ence (particularly with the deontic expectative sense “you (really) 
should be able to”): 
B: if your assignments are not too much for you, you will be able to 
carry out this assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h.  
In this way the conditional presents a clear either-or (A or B) critical 
characterization of the situation from the sender’s point of view as 
formed from its explicit and implied alternatives, alternatives which 
seem entirely in accord with the general critical thrust of the letter. By 
contrast neither the C nor the D inferences are suitable in context 
(assuming this sense of the conditional as a whole): 
C: if your assignments are not too much for you, you will not be able 
to carry out this assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h. 
D: if your assignments are too much for you, you will be able to carry 
out this assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h. 
In table form: 
 Antecedent Consequent 
A [your assignments too much for you] 
[you not able to 
carry out this one] 
B [your assignments not too much for you] 
[you able to carry 
out this one] 
C [your assignments not too much for you] 
[you not able to 
carry out this one] 
D [your assignments too much for you] 
[you able to carry 
out this one] 
Tab. 11. Table of antecedent-consequent relations 
for pBiblNat 198III vs., ll. 3-4 
                                                
21 For example, see recently D. Sweeney, Correspondence and Dialogue, p. 224-225 
(ex. 76). 
22 So E.F. Wente, Letters from Ancient Egypt (WAW 1), 1990, p. 173 (no. 288) as 
against his earlier treatment (with ‘accomplish’) in E.F. Wente, Late Ramesside Letters 
(SAOC 33), 1967, p. 82. 
23 Notice that taking Sm m to mean “get out of” brings about a concessive reading of 
the conditional and thus IPO inferences (so the C reading becomes acceptable with 
inclusive reading of the polarity options for the antecedent: “even if your assignments are 
not too much for you, you will not get out of this assignment of Pharaoh l.p.h.”, i.e. you 
will have to do it in any case). 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Through concentrating primarily on conditional examples displaying the 
negative third future, I hope to have elucidated some of the properties of 
these conditionals, particularly in terms of how considering implicated 
obversion and alternates can enrich our reading and understanding of 
these examples in context and how that reading can be made explicit. In 
particular, I have pointed to the consistency of implicated full obversion 
inferencing (IFO: the B implication here) or implicated partial obversion 
inferencing (IPO: the C implication here) as an important means of 
pragmatically enriching the reading of conditionals in context. 
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